Feeding the horses

[skip.knox]

Here's another one for the military specialists (I know you're there, I can see you behind those bushes).

I was reading a history of the 30 Years War and came across one expedition where the numbers given were 22,000 soldiers and 20,000 cavalry. That gave me pause, though not hooves.

First, let's just pretend the numbers are accurate (they're likely higher than actual). 20k horses must translate to more horses than that, for replacements must be ready to hand. Does anyone have a sense of what was usual, or even ideal? One reserve per one active?

Second, even sticking with 20k, that is a *lot* of training! This made me wonder how that training got done. Did each cavalry person handle their own? That doesn't seem efficient. So, somewhere there were centers for breeding, raising, and training cavalry horses. That still leaves the cavalrymen needing to train maneuvers together. This is starting to look very expensive. Or did the armies just take whomever had a horse and a pistol, and maneuvers weren't much more than "go long, left"?

Which brought me roundabout to feeding. Hay? Oats? However you figure it, horses consume large quantities of food, and that makes for a genuinely huge supply train. It's small wonder that governments went broke trying to participate in war. Especially this war, which went on for so long and where much of it was fought over the very lands that were supposed to be supplying the armies.

Lastly, that's just the cavalry. Now add the animals needed to pull those supplies. Now add all the animals involved with the camp followers. No wonder the approach of an army, even a friendly one, was regarded with such terror during the 1630s and 1640s.

 

[Mad Swede]

Here's another one for the military specialists (I know you're there, I can see you behind those bushes).

I was reading a history of the 30 Years War and came across one expedition where the numbers given were 22,000 soldiers and 20,000 cavalry. That gave me pause, though not hooves.

First, let's just pretend the numbers are accurate (they're likely higher than actual). 20k horses must translate to more horses than that, for replacements must be ready to hand. Does anyone have a sense of what was usual, or even ideal? One reserve per one active?

Second, even sticking with 20k, that is a *lot* of training! This made me wonder how that training got done. Did each cavalry person handle their own? That doesn't seem efficient. So, somewhere there were centers for breeding, raising, and training cavalry horses. That still leaves the cavalrymen needing to train maneuvers together. This is starting to look very expensive. Or did the armies just take whomever had a horse and a pistol, and maneuvers weren't much more than "go long, left"?

Which brought me roundabout to feeding. Hay? Oats? However you figure it, horses consume large quantities of food, and that makes for a genuinely huge supply train. It's small wonder that governments went broke trying to participate in war. Especially this war, which went on for so long and where much of it was fought over the very lands that were supposed to be supplying the armies.

Lastly, that's just the cavalry. Now add the animals needed to pull those supplies. Now add all the animals involved with the camp followers. No wonder the approach of an army, even a friendly one, was regarded with such terror during the 1630s and 1640s.

No, those numbers are about right. At Mainz, Gustav Adolf's personal strike force consisted of just over 16000 men. In 1632 the Swedes had about 140000 men in the field, although most of those were German and Scottish troops.

At this time, each Swedish cavalryman had one horse, and this was standard for a couple of hundred years. Horses were carefully selected, and so cost money. That meant that care was taken when it came to feeding and training the horses. Tactics were developed and practised, so the various regiments had regular training and exercises, including what we now called combined arms operations - cavlry and infantry exercised together and were trained to work together. This was in large part what made the Swedish armies so successful in the Thirty Years War, they were simply better trained than their opponents. The Swedes could afford this as a result of Indelningsverket, a way of getting a group of farmers to nominate and pay for one soldier.

Feeding the men and horses on campaign was a challenge. Generally Gustav Adolf tried to avoid looting which meant that he had to raise the money needed to pay for supplies. Supplies were hard to obtain in the winter, and so armies either went into winter quarters or conducted smaller scale operations (as at Demmin in 1630). Either way the level of conflict was usually lower in the winter months. Logistics started to develop in the Swedish army at about this time, largely as a result of the need to keep the army supplied in the field.

The need to feed horses was a major constraint up until about 1925 in most western European armies. The reason the Schlieffen Plan failed in 1914 was largely because the Germans outran their supplies, especially those needed for horses, and so could not reach their operational aims. The British had a much better supply chain (largely thanks to General, later Field Marshal, Sir William Robertson) and so could keep their armies supplied.

 

[pmmg]

Got to really hate someone to go through all that.

 

[Finchbearer]

I’m curious to know what they actually fed them with though. Oats as skip suggested or maybe even gorse??

 

[Mad Swede]

I’m curious to know what they actually fed them with though. Oats as skip suggested or maybe even gorse??

Generally horses were and are fed oats, hay, cut grass (when available) and straw, sometimes with the addition of barley, alfa alfa, peas, beans and bran. Corn can also used, but it can't be green corn. A horse eats about 2 1/2 times its weight in feed when the horse is working so transporting enough feed can be a challenge.

 

[Aldarion]

Here's another one for the military specialists (I know you're there, I can see you behind those bushes).

I was reading a history of the 30 Years War and came across one expedition where the numbers given were 22,000 soldiers and 20,000 cavalry. That gave me pause, though not hooves.

First, let's just pretend the numbers are accurate (they're likely higher than actual). 20k horses must translate to more horses than that, for replacements must be ready to hand. Does anyone have a sense of what was usual, or even ideal? One reserve per one active?

Second, even sticking with 20k, that is a *lot* of training! This made me wonder how that training got done. Did each cavalry person handle their own? That doesn't seem efficient. So, somewhere there were centers for breeding, raising, and training cavalry horses. That still leaves the cavalrymen needing to train maneuvers together. This is starting to look very expensive. Or did the armies just take whomever had a horse and a pistol, and maneuvers weren't much more than "go long, left"?

Which brought me roundabout to feeding. Hay? Oats? However you figure it, horses consume large quantities of food, and that makes for a genuinely huge supply train. It's small wonder that governments went broke trying to participate in war. Especially this war, which went on for so long and where much of it was fought over the very lands that were supposed to be supplying the armies.

Lastly, that's just the cavalry. Now add the animals needed to pull those supplies. Now add all the animals involved with the camp followers. No wonder the approach of an army, even a friendly one, was regarded with such terror during the 1630s and 1640s.

No, the numbers are correct.

I am hardly well-read on the 30 Years War, so I cannot really contribute more than what Mad Swede already did, but these numbers do sound right to me. That war had significant cavalry in every army. And it was hardly unique: Matthias Corvinus' Black Army in Vienna was 20 000 cavalry and 8 000 infantry. Ottoman armies were also mostly cavalry throughout the Ottoman - Hungarian wars, for all that we (rightly) hear of their disciplined infantry.

Basically: if cavalry works and works well enough, states will go to expense to provide sufficient cavalry, one way or another. And medieval states were able to field armies larger than what you note for the above, so it is hardly a surprise that a 30 Year War era state should be able to field such an army.

And cavalry did train maneuvers together. This again was hardly new, and considering regiments were IIRC often organized territorially, doing training will not have been too difficult.

Also, one of reasons why Thirty Years War was so devastating to civilian population was precisely because armies had to be fed. And this was a constant problem in warfare until introduction of the internal combustion engine. When Crusaders passed through Croatia, basically everybody ran away. Up until they reached the Byzantine territory and were able to connect to Byzantine logistical support system, Crusaders devastated the lands they were passing through - simply because they had to feed themselves. Basically, either you established supply depots along the line of march months in advance, or you had to take food from local populace. No three ways about it. And because army sizes in the 30 Years War exploded compared to earlier... yeah. Hunger and famine all around.

 

[skip.knox]

Thanks for the replies. I still wonder about a couple of things. The feed item is most easily addressed: horses graze. They can graze on surprisingly thin ground cover, though it's probably poor nourishment for working horses (whether cavalry or transport). But there would be some recourse, however scanty, pretty much anywhere. There would still be need for large amounts of feed. I picture forage parties heading out with a whole train of empty wagons behind them.

The matter of financing is more complex. States did not always finance armies directly. Most often, they provided a lump of cash (or a line of credit) to a commander, who was the one who saw to provisioning (and pay). Commanders constantly and chronically complained about insufficient and untimely pay from kings and other great lords. The 30YW stands at an important change in how armies operated. It's a hugely complex topic, sometimes gathered under the rubric of the Military Revolution, but the general shift was from the terribly scattered, inconsistent, and slapdash systems of the late Middle Ages to the centralized and far more devastating systems of the early modern era (17thc/18thc). What one sees during the actual period 1618-1648 is a period in transition.

I wonder about the training. I read about battles in which who armies were disrupted--battlefield casualties, sure, but also segments scattered, commanders dead or relieved and replaced. Whatever unity might have been present in the cavalry at one point must have been severely tested at a later point. With, say, hundreds of horses dead or injured, various officers lost, there would have to be re-training. But the army is in the field, facing enemies, often in hostile territory. There was work to do. Who would have time to train? And where would the replacement horses be found? How long would a cavalryman who had lost his mount need in order to be effective enough to fight in formation?

It must have been a hodge-podge. Everyone would understand how it was all *supposed* to work, but actual circumstances must have been trying. I can see a successful commander being successful not least because he was able to deal with such crises as defeat or a failure of funds could bring about.

Lastly, there would have been cross-cultural challenges. Swedish cavalry serving with Palatine cavalry and maybe even French cavalry. Even leaving aside the language challenges, I doubt they all agreed on what constituted a proper formation for this or that sort of situation. Some fun arguments in the command tent, there.

 

[Mad Swede]

Thanks for the replies. I still wonder about a couple of things. The feed item is most easily addressed: horses graze. They can graze on surprisingly thin ground cover, though it's probably poor nourishment for working horses (whether cavalry or transport). But there would be some recourse, however scanty, pretty much anywhere. There would still be need for large amounts of feed. I picture forage parties heading out with a whole train of empty wagons behind them.

The matter of financing is more complex. States did not always finance armies directly. Most often, they provided a lump of cash (or a line of credit) to a commander, who was the one who saw to provisioning (and pay). Commanders constantly and chronically complained about insufficient and untimely pay from kings and other great lords. The 30YW stands at an important change in how armies operated. It's a hugely complex topic, sometimes gathered under the rubric of the Military Revolution, but the general shift was from the terribly scattered, inconsistent, and slapdash systems of the late Middle Ages to the centralized and far more devastating systems of the early modern era (17thc/18thc). What one sees during the actual period 1618-1648 is a period in transition.

I wonder about the training. I read about battles in which who armies were disrupted--battlefield casualties, sure, but also segments scattered, commanders dead or relieved and replaced. Whatever unity might have been present in the cavalry at one point must have been severely tested at a later point. With, say, hundreds of horses dead or injured, various officers lost, there would have to be re-training. But the army is in the field, facing enemies, often in hostile territory. There was work to do. Who would have time to train? And where would the replacement horses be found? How long would a cavalryman who had lost his mount need in order to be effective enough to fight in formation?

It must have been a hodge-podge. Everyone would understand how it was all *supposed* to work, but actual circumstances must have been trying. I can see a successful commander being successful not least because he was able to deal with such crises as defeat or a failure of funds could bring about.

Lastly, there would have been cross-cultural challenges. Swedish cavalry serving with Palatine cavalry and maybe even French cavalry. Even leaving aside the language challenges, I doubt they all agreed on what constituted a proper formation for this or that sort of situation. Some fun arguments in the command tent, there.

Yes, the Thirty Years War does represent a transition in military tactics, organisation and professionalism. It wasn't hodge-podge, certainly not in Sweden. What many do not appreciate is just how much Gustav Adolf revolutionised military organisation. Whilst he was in the field there was a whole organisation in Sweden and the Swedish Baltic Empire training new troops and officers, organising supplies and generally providing support. Only when you see how the Swedes planned and conducted the build up of supplies before they got involved in the war do you realise what an organisation they had. And it wasn't just the military, many of his civilian governmental principles are followed even today.

Languages weren't quite the problem you think. Gustav Adolf was very well educated, and he and his senior officers spoke Swedish, Latin, German and French. Neither was funding, Gustav Adolf had a very effective financial treasury and his soldiers were paid regularly and on time. As for common tactics, national contingents tended to operate separately (they still do) so trying to mix troops from different countries in one regiment or brigade did not occur.

 

[Finchbearer]

You’ve taken me on my own research tangent, for the entirety of what I write whether it’s fantasy or not is written in a historical context - so horses are the principle mode of transport and utility for all sorts of things - agriculture too.

It’s interesting about the feed. Different horses would have been allocated different feed too apparently. I also think there would have been a foraging culture, for supplementing or otherwise as normal practice…but that would be so highly dependent on so many factors. Season, geographical location, general location (woodland, heathland, mountainous).

Anyway, just thought I’d say it’s interesting.

 

[skip.knox]

No argument from me about Gustav Adolf (never argue with a Swede when they're mad, to paragraph Grace Slick). There were other examples of good organization, but there were plenty of the other sort, whether you look at the Imperial forces, Bavaria, even the Dutch or the Palatine or whatever. In fact, no one could match the level of organization that Sweden had, at least under the King and then under Oxenstierna. Once one turns one's attention elsewhere, the examples of efficiency and consistency are harder to find.

Plenty of the upper class were multilingual. But again I'm thinking more of how things worked down at the unit level. Especially later, during the French phase of the war, after the Maurices and Gustavs and Bernards were gone, units were often patched together ad hoc. Even speaking "German" was problematic, what with Hochdeutsch, Plattedeutsch, and more localized dialects like Swaebischerdeutsch. I picture the Swabian trying to shout orders to the Mecklenburger.

It all worked, more or less, though I do wonder if some of the numerous reversals of fortune might not have been simply from miscommunication in one form or another. Or from horses that were simply not up to one more charge.

Coming back around to writing, I think Guy Gavriel Key does a very fine job not merely attending to details like this, but actually giving them a role to play in his stories.

 

[Aldarion]

The matter of financing is more complex. States did not always finance armies directly. Most often, they provided a lump of cash (or a line of credit) to a commander, who was the one who saw to provisioning (and pay). Commanders constantly and chronically complained about insufficient and untimely pay from kings and other great lords. The 30YW stands at an important change in how armies operated. It's a hugely complex topic, sometimes gathered under the rubric of the Military Revolution, but the general shift was from the terribly scattered, inconsistent, and slapdash systems of the late Middle Ages to the centralized and far more devastating systems of the early modern era (17thc/18thc). What one sees during the actual period 1618-1648 is a period in transition.

Don't know about Sweden - as Mad Swede about it - but in Austria, and I suspect elsewhere as well, that was precisely what happened. State would provide a line of finance to commander, who would then go to recruit mercenaries. For example, in 1632 Austrian Emperor simply called Wallenstein back into service and paid him money, and then Wallenstein went around recruiting and organizing the army.

In fact, individual regiments were named after people who had raised them, often their commanders (a practice which continued well into 18th century). So at Lutzen in 1632, you have regiments Sparr, Bonninghausen, Lamboy, Orossy...

You might find this useful:

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/293048746.pdf

I wonder about the training. I read about battles in which who armies were disrupted--battlefield casualties, sure, but also segments scattered, commanders dead or relieved and replaced. Whatever unity might have been present in the cavalry at one point must have been severely tested at a later point. With, say, hundreds of horses dead or injured, various officers lost, there would have to be re-training. But the army is in the field, facing enemies, often in hostile territory. There was work to do. Who would have time to train? And where would the replacement horses be found? How long would a cavalryman who had lost his mount need in order to be effective enough to fight in formation?

If casualties were severe and and time short, it was always possible to combine depleted units into new full-strength units... assuming of course that the troops were of the same origin.

 

[Rexenm]

All those are details, what about the human element, or is that backward? I picture some rebels, or a formation broken, when I imagine war. A small scale war perhaps - or a civil war. Maybe so many horses, that they inspire a plague, creating famine in the lands. Who is the regalia looking for - are they impoverished, or exulted? There is little you can’t find in books.

 

[Aldarion]

All those are details, what about the human element, or is that backward? I picture some rebels, or a formation broken, when I imagine war. A small scale war perhaps - or a civil war. Maybe so many horses, that they inspire a plague, creating famine in the lands. Who is the regalia looking for - are they impoverished, or exulted? There is little you can’t find in books.

War can indeed cause famine as armies appropriate food for feeding themselves - and the horses.

 

[skip.knox]

Troops did tend to stay together. For this war I think of Bernard's troops who found themselves reduced and reduced again, mainly due to disease and battle losses. After their commander died, they had a sort of committee of their own officers to lead them, but this dissipated over time. Eventually there were only about three thousand of them and they were under French command. But those three thousand still fought and camped as a unit.

On the battlefield, the French commanders had to pass instructions to these Germans. I'm sure there were multilingual officers. Once engaged, those three thousand would have been shouting in German (Hochdeutsch, I'm guessing).

Those three thousand must have gone through more than a few horses, though, and I doubt there would have been much time for training. A veteran rider, though, might have been able to manage a new horse well enough to stay in formation and not bolt under gunfire.

Now I'm picturing some cavalryman having to go into battle on some nag because the region had been burned over and nothing better was to be had. Either ride this farm horse or else try making the charge on foot!

 

[Rexenm]

Now I'm picturing some cavalryman having to go into battle on some nag because the region had been burned over and nothing better was to be had. Either ride this farm horse or else try making the charge on foot!

Is a nag some kind of horse - or some kind of hag, because I don’t know.

 

[Aldarion]

Is a nag some kind of horse - or some kind of hag, because I don’t know.

It is hag of a horse.

Specifically, an old horse in poor condition.

 

[Finchbearer]

It is hag of a horse.

Specifically, an old horse in poor condition.

Not heard of that before…

A hag is usually a word used to describe an older woman who is somewhat bedraggled or witch like. ‘Nag’ or ‘nagging’ is akin to ‘moaning’ - nagging at someone to do something.

 

[Aldarion]

Not heard of that before…

A hag is usually a word used to describe an older woman who is somewhat bedraggled or witch like. ‘Nag’ or ‘nagging’ is akin to ‘moaning’ - nagging at someone to do something.

That is why I used the pun. "Hag" is an older woman who is bedraggled. "Nag" is an older horse who is bedraggled.

And "nagging" may have come from "nag", though they may also be unrelated.

nag | Etymology of nag by etymonline

NAG: "find fault constantly;" by 1840, intransitive, "annoy by continued scolding, pester with petty… See origin and meaning of nag.

www.etymonline.com

 

[Finchbearer]

In the UK we use ‘nag’ quite often and ‘nagging’ is the doing verb that again is used quite often. ‘He’s nagging at me to do the laundry’. Never heard hag actually used to describe an older horse, doesn’t mean someone hasn’t somewhere…

 

[Aldarion]

In the UK we use ‘nag’ quite often and ‘nagging’ is the doing verb that again is used quite often. ‘He’s nagging at me to do the laundry’. Never heard hag actually used to describe an older horse, doesn’t mean someone hasn’t somewhere…

It is "nag" that is an older horse. "Hag" is an older woman.