Premodern recruitment systems and army logistics

[Aldarion]

I'm not a historian. So I am so confused and doubtful of what you're saying, or implying with all this.

The reason is: Forced conscription of commoners happens today, in modern advanced societies. Countries like South Korea and Israel have mandatory service. In the US we still have veterans from Vietnam who were forced into battle.

Is there something that prevented countries from rounding up peasants, spending a month training them on basic pike formations, and sending them into combat? It wouldn't take that much training or all that much equipment.

So color me confused, but why would conscripting the common person into combat be a modern invention?

Basically? Logistics and economy.

Now, to be clear here: I am not saying that forced conscription of commoners didn't happen at all, just that it was not a regular thing or a basis of any historical military system. Conscription did happen when one's own city / town / village was under attack... but can you really call it "forced conscription" when the enemy is at the gates and the alternative is getting murdered anyway? You might as well pick up a weapon and go out fighting.

But any sort of campaigning beyond half-a-day's walk away from one's area - and in reality, much closer than that because fields need tending - was simply not economical for anything other than dedicated soldiering class. And in that case, you don't need or want forced conscription, because chances are you will find enough willing recruits keen for plunder.

There are also logistics to consider. When you send an army on a campaign, you also need to feed it. And this also means feeding animals with the army - which means horses, but also the pack animals carrying equipment and food. In Roman army, every contubernion of eight men had a pack animal just for their equipment - and then add the food and so on... numbers get really big, really quickly.

And that is expensive. Food is expensive, animals even more so. Army can also be only so large before it becomes impossible for it to sustain itself from forage when on the enemy territory - and only very centralized, urban states (such as ancient empires and modern states) were able to organize complex system of supply depots required to sustain massive armies of 50 000 or more men.

All of this means is that you have to rely on quality over quantity, because quantity is simply impossible to achieve. And this means using trained soldiers. How you get them, well, now that is a more complex question - you can have full-time professional soldiers, part-time soldiers, mercenaries and so on - but point is, you want your soldiers to be well-trained and as well-equipped as you can afford.

You cannot really use modern societies as a comparative point for medieval society because... again, logistics and economy. In medieval times, it generally took maybe five (and in some areas, even more) families of farmers to support one family of urban dwellers, because food surplus simply wasn't that large. In a modern society, you can have one farming family support five or more families of urban dwellers. It is this advance of agriculture which made it possible to maintain massive armies of conscripts on long campaigns (first such example is probably the French Revolution). And if you are talking about feudal states specifically, those didn't even have the administration that would be necessary to organize the system of conscription you are suggesting, at least not on a scale that would be useful for long wars (Romans could do it, as evidenced by the Punic wars, but even then that was a) only an auxilliary measure - majority of troops were still landowners, b) done in a time of emergency and c) for a very short period of time).

 

[Mad Swede]

To answer Devor question from a professional military point of view.

Starting with conscription - this is relatively modern and first appears in France as a result of the French Revolution and the need to defend the Republic from external attack. The Republic was able to train these conscripts, at least to the degree needed to defeat the much smaller armies of other European kingdoms. For the Prussians in particular it came as a nasty surprise when their small but well trained and well equipped army was defeated by the French, simply because the Prussians had been relying on quality to defeat other armies of similar size. Conscription in it's modern form is not comparable to the system of levies used in western Europe from about 700AD onwards.

Levies did form the basis of military forces in western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. An example would be the Anglo-Saxon fyrd. The composition of the fyrd varied quite a bit, but it basically consisted of a central core of soldiers provided by the King and a collection of levied local farmers and peasants who were equipped and provisioned by their lord. The English system as set up by Alfred the Great is recorded in a document known as the Burghal Hidage. The system survived into the Norman period and Henry I is recorded as using the system in 1101 and 1102 in the chronicler Orderic Vitalis' Historia Ecclesiastica (books 7 to 13 for those who want to read).

The concepts behind the fyrd led to the development (in the British Isles) of the Shire Levy. This was the system by which the Sheriff would call up a number of able-bodied men to serve the King, and it was regulated in at least two Assizes of Arms and also (I think) in a separate statute issued by Edward I. The Shire Levy was a complement to the service of noble families and formed the basis for the English armies used during the Hundred Years War. The French had a similar system called the arrière-ban which was used at various times up to the Thirty Years War.

It is important to note that many of those who were called to serve in those sorts of levies lacked training and the levies were in some cases nothing more than a mob equipped with knives and clubs. This was one of the reasons that later French Kings didn't use the arrière-ban. Some rulers attempted to overcome such limitations by placing an obligation on their vassals to train with certain sorts of weapons (longbows are the classic example), and the two English Assizes of Arms I mentioned regulate this. Training with weapons could take time and skilled soldiers (and military engineers) sometimes sold their services to the highest bidders - this wasn't always seen as a good thing, and sometimes such free companies could find themselves on the receiving end of a royal campaign to eradicate them.

As for supporting an army in the field, that was usually done by plundering the local area for food. Armies tended to live off the land, which meant that even limited campaigns could have a large impact on wider society. Logistics in it's modern sense was something first properly developed by Napoleon, although even his armies relied partly on foraging for food.

Overall, the depictions of armies and those who serve in them in A Song of Ice and Fire are not unrealistic - GRR Martin did quite a lot of research before he wrote the books and it shows.

 

[Aldarion]

Levies did form the basis of military forces in western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. An example would be the Anglo-Saxon fyrd. The composition of the fyrd varied quite a bit, but it basically consisted of a central core of soldiers provided by the King and a collection of levied local farmers and peasants who were equipped and provisioned by their lord. The English system as set up by Alfred the Great is recorded in a document known as the Burghal Hidage. The system survived into the Norman period and Henry I is recorded as using the system in 1101 and 1102 in the chronicler Orderic Vitalis' Historia Ecclesiastica (books 7 to 13 for those who want to read).

The "great fyrd" you are describing here appears to be exclusively defensive, however. Offensive actions would be undertaken by the "select levy" of nobles and aristocratic warriors.

And as a matter of fact, it is doubtful that the "peasant levy" fyrd even existed in the first place. What does appear to have existed is something similar to Hungarian militia portalis, where a soldier would be equipped for each group of X households (for fyrd, that would apparently be one soldier for five hides, which basically means that five families / households would band together to provide one soldier).

The concepts behind the fyrd led to the development (in the British Isles) of the Shire Levy. This was the system by which the Sheriff would call up a number of able-bodied men to serve the King, and it was regulated in at least two Assizes of Arms and also (I think) in a separate statute issued by Edward I. The Shire Levy was a complement to the service of noble families and formed the basis for the English armies used during the Hundred Years War. The French had a similar system called the arrière-ban which was used at various times up to the Thirty Years War.

It is important to note that many of those who were called to serve in those sorts of levies lacked training and the levies were in some cases nothing more than a mob equipped with knives and clubs. This was one of the reasons that later French Kings didn't use the arrière-ban. Some rulers attempted to overcome such limitations by placing an obligation on their vassals to train with certain sorts of weapons (longbows are the classic example), and the two English Assizes of Arms I mentioned regulate this. Training with weapons could take time and skilled soldiers (and military engineers) sometimes sold their services to the highest bidders - this wasn't always seen as a good thing, and sometimes such free companies could find themselves on the receiving end of a royal campaign to eradicate them.

Now, English armies are not something I can claim to have much knowledge of. However, looking at Hungary, it seems unlikely that such levies will have ever been used on a regular basis. Hungary was not a rich kingdom, yet it very rarely raised such a "mob at arms" that you are describing. The closest to that was the Exercitus Generalis which I described here - but note that it was a) called only very sporadically and b) not utilized at all after 1439., which is the last recorded instance of it being used.

So said "mob equipped with knives and clubs" would have been used in emergency as a sort of local defense force, but it would not have been the "typical" feudal army. Trained and well equipped troops were preferable whenever they could be procured.

As for supporting an army in the field, that was usually done by plundering the local area for food. Armies tended to live off the land, which meant that even limited campaigns could have a large impact on wider society. Logistics in it's modern sense was something first properly developed by Napoleon, although even his armies relied partly on foraging for food.

Ottoman Empire and Hungary regularly mounted winter-time campaigns, even if they preferred not to. In fact, looking at both John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus, their campaigns against the Ottomans tended to start in the autumn and end in the spring. And looking at non-feudal forces, even the Roman Republic was capable of fielding armies and supporting them through year-round campaigns, and its successors - Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire - also campaigned through winter with some regularity. Now, it is true that winter campaigns were never the preferred mode of operation - foraging was important for supply, and would remain so until horses got replaced by railways and trucks as main transport - but saying that "logistics in it's modern sense was something first properly developed by Napoleon" misses the mark by... some 2 000 years, give or take.

Overall, the depictions of armies and those who serve in them in A Song of Ice and Fire are not unrealistic - GRR Martin did quite a lot of research before he wrote the books and it shows.

That is true - mostly because Martin's actual depictions of armies in A Song of Ice and Fire contradict Septon Meribald's description on a fundamental level. While Martin may have intended to show armies staffed by conscripted and untrained peasants, he obviously did do his research, and as a result, what he actually depicted was completely different from what Meribald's speech implies and what his intention may have been.

 

[Mad Swede]

The "great fyrd" you are describing here appears to be exclusively defensive, however. Offensive actions would be undertaken by the "select levy" of nobles and aristocratic warriors.

Except that I did not mention the so-called great fyrd. That is/was a concept proposed in the 1950s and it is generally regarded as incorrect.

And as a matter of fact, it is doubtful that the "peasant levy" fyrd even existed in the first place. What does appear to have existed is something similar to Hungarian militia portalis, where a soldier would be equipped for each group of X households (for fyrd, that would apparently be one soldier for five hides, which basically means that five families / households would band together to provide one soldier).

Yes, the levied fyrd did exist - this is documented in the Burghal Hidage and in its later Norman form in the Historia Ecclesiastica. Linking to a web page with no references what so ever is not supporting evidence for your argument.

The idea of one soldier per five hides is incorrect, as the JSTOR paper you linked to makes clear. In fact, the contribution expected from each lord varied and that was one of the reasons the Burghal Hidage was written, to codify who contributed what to the fyrd.

Now, English armies are not something I can claim to have much knowledge of. However, looking at Hungary, it seems unlikely that such levies will have ever been used on a regular basis. Hungary was not a rich kingdom, yet it very rarely raised such a "mob at arms" that you are describing. The closest to that was the Exercitus Generalis which I described here - but note that it was a) called only very sporadically and b) not utilized at all after 1439., which is the last recorded instance of it being used.

Let me see if I've got this straight. You have no detailed knowledge of English armies yet you ignore the historical references I gave which describe how such levies were raied and used in reality. Really?

Ottoman Empire and Hungary regularly mounted winter-time campaigns, even if they preferred not to. In fact, looking at both John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus, their campaigns against the Ottomans tended to start in the autumn and end in the spring. And looking at non-feudal forces, even the Roman Republic was capable of fielding armies and supporting them through year-round campaigns, and its successors - Roman Empire and the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire - also campaigned through winter with some regularity. Now, it is true that winter campaigns were never the preferred mode of operation - foraging was important for supply, and would remain so until horses got replaced by railways and trucks as main transport - but saying that "logistics in it's modern sense was something first properly developed by Napoleon" misses the mark by... some 2 000 years, give or take.

Modern military logistics did start with Napoleon, as did the concept of a general staff. He and his staff planned the logistics in a way not seen previously in western Europe. The Roman system relied partly on foraging and partly on their ability to build fortified points where supplies could be stored close to the areas of deployment. The main focus of Roman logistics was food and drink, since their forces were mostly infantry. Napoleon was having to manage both food and ammunition on a scale the Romans had never attempted. Bear in mind here that a Roman legion was somewhere between 5000 and 6000 men, where as Napoleons Grande Armée at its largest was over 400,000 men grouped in several corps of between 10,000 and 50,000 men. Even the divisions within the corps were bigger than a Roman legion.

That is true - mostly because Martin's actual depictions of armies in A Song of Ice and Fire contradict Septon Meribald's description on a fundamental level. While Martin may have intended to show armies staffed by conscripted and untrained peasants, he obviously did do his research, and as a result, what he actually depicted was completely different from what Meribald's speech implies and what his intention may have been.

The effects that PTSD can have on people hasn't changed much and there are historical accounts of what we now recognise as PTSD dating back to Ancient Greece - the earliest account I've read is in Herodotus decription of the Battle of Marathon (490BC). I've also read Johannes Hofer's contemporary description (1688) of we would now call PTSD in Swiss soldiers.

Martin's description of the broken men in Septon Meribald's monologue is a fairly accurate description of many of those men who were in the routier bands during the Hundred Years War, both in terms of their inability to go home or fit in anywhere and in terms of their behaviour. For a more complete academic treatise and discussion I recommend you read "Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans", edited by Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Lainé and Frédéric Boutoulle.

 

[ThinkerX]

I use a variant of the Roman Legion model in my stories. Until the Traag War hit, these were volunteer units. Plebes and other free commoners could join the legions - assuming they passed the physicals. So, too, could bondsmen/serfs - though that caused friction with their overlords. Training began on the march - running with full packs, jumping, climbing, swimming, and maintaining formation. Weapon training starts with staffs and spears and works up to swords and crossbows.

The legions were deliberately over-officered - pretty much double the necessary number of tribunes and centurions and petty officers. Hence, when needed, the surplus officers and a few vets would be separated from the rest, creating a 'Gemeni' or 'Twin' legion of the original, with the ranks filled by levies and conscripts.

The Traag War brought some major changes to this system - first the introduction of bicycles, which while heavy and clunky, still tripled the speed with which a fully equipped legion could move - 60-70 miles a day, roads depending (call it a little under 100 kilometers). At the end of the war, the Solarians started using catapults to hurl large barrels filled with explosive powder and shrapnel. Shortly afterward, they stuffed the explosives into thick crossbow bolts that exploded on impact.

Pay for the common soldier wasn't much - until they hit the rank of centurion or landed one of the more in demand 'immune' (artisan) positions. Until the Traag War, veterans who completed a twenty-year stint got land and citizenship in return, or in the case of immunes a shop and citizenship. The Traag War turned the imperial treasury into an empty room. Lacking the cash to keep most of a million men under arms or properly pay them off, the emperor instead offered land and citizenship to all soldiers, not just those with twenty years in the ranks.

The Church maintains an army of its own, recruited from the ranks of the faithful. These units, the 'Liberators' are like bad copies of the legions, with much less in the way of equipment and training than the state army - about two notches above a mob armed with knives and clubs. The Liberator Legions were all 'twinned' during the Traag War, with predictably disastrous results. Several of the twins were all but wiped out.

 

[pmmg]

I hate to say in all this wonderful talk and information, but in my own story, there are armies, and while I do consider my supply chains, I dont much consider where they come from. I don't think it matters much in the story I am writing. And I question, where did the Armies of Gondor and Rohan come from? Was that drawn out to be explained, or is the reader to just assume --well, from somewhere?. I think, if pressed, I would say there is a pecking order of a type. The professional type soldier do the work, until the threat becomes too great and more bodies are needed, which kind of bleeds down into the male labor stock, and in the case of being over-run, everything that can hold a sword. And if not Gondor, I could sub in one of many well known fantasy stories. They do have to come from somewhere, but I am not sure the reader really needs to have it answered.

I am sure, if I pulled my Jarl, or King, into the real world and had a Q & A with them, they could explain the system of gaining and fielding troops, but so far, its just not mattered. The war is kind of a All or nothing affair. No one thinks if their side loses, they will be left alive when its over, so its an all in kind of effort.

 

[Mad Swede]

I hate to say in all this wonderful talk and information, but in my own story, there are armies, and while I do consider my supply chains, I dont much consider where they come from. I don't think it matters much in the story I am writing. And I question, where did the Armies of Gondor and Rohan come from? Was that drawn out to be explained, or is the reader to just assume --well, from somewhere?. I think, if pressed, I would say there is a pecking order of a type. The professional type soldier do the work, until the threat becomes too great and more bodies are needed, which kind of bleeds down into the male labor stock, and in the case of being over-run, everything that can hold a sword. And if not Gondor, I could sub in one of many well known fantasy stories. They do have to come from somewhere, but I am not sure the reader really needs to have it answered.

I am sure, if I pulled my Jarl, or King, into the real world and had a Q & A with them, they could explain the system of gaining and fielding troops, but so far, its just not mattered. The war is kind of a All or nothing affair. No one thinks if their side loses, they will be left alive when its over, so its an all in kind of effort.

To be honest, going into that sort of detail isn't necessary unless you're an obsessive world builder. The reason I know so much about it is that as a senior officer I was expected to have academic knowledge on the subject at research degree level (yes, I do have a research degree). Even then what I was expected to do with that knowledge was to extract and then abstract experiences and lessons from the past which could then be applied to current military operations.

So do we need the details at all? Well, sometimes.

If some of your characters join the army, why do they do so? Is it of their own volition, in which case why was that and how do they react to the reality of life in the army? Are they conscripted in some way, in which case why did they get picked and how do they look on that? What happens to them in the army and how does it change them? To me this is all about character development, and as an author I'd be looking to ask similar questions about a character going into a craft trade like metalsmithing. It's also about creating those little hooks that you can use later for plot development.

The effects of war also need considering. David Eddings did a surprisingly good job of that in the Elenium series (although most readers miss it) when Talen asks (in all innocence) why they don't just summon all the the knights and armies and then crush the enemy. The reply he gets is that whilst that would be possible the last time that was done it took the countries on the continent several generations to recover because the war had caused such devastation and so many deaths. Tolkien too mentions this, although in his case it's in the appendicies to the Lord of the Rings where he describes the way Arnor changed as a result of all the deaths during the war with Sauron. Winning a war is one thing, but it comes at a price. And yes, these effects can be used as plot hooks too.

 

[Aldarion]

Yes, the levied fyrd did exist - this is documented in the Burghal Hidage and in its later Norman form in the Historia Ecclesiastica. Linking to a web page with no references what so ever is not supporting evidence for your argument.

Levied fyrd yes, but what kind of levies? As I described from the Hungarian model, levies were not what one would think of when hearing the phrase "peasant levies", even if they were technically recruited among the peasants.

Let me see if I've got this straight. You have no detailed knowledge of English armies yet you ignore the historical references I gave which describe how such levies were raied and used in reality. Really?

I see no reason why there would be fundamental differences between English feudal armies and Hungarian feudal armies. And non-feudal premodern societies faced many of the same limitations that feudal societies did, especially on longer-term campaigns.

Basically: why, according to you, would English (and French) practice be to press-gang peasants into armies wielding sticks and pitchforks, while Hungary took care to have recruited peasants selected, armed and trained for the campaign? If English and French armies really did use conscripted / press-ganged peasant levies of the sort George Martin is believed to be describing, that would imply that there were fundamental differences in sociopolitical and socioeconomic conditions in England and France when compared to Hungary and Croatia. Now, what I know of pre-15th century Polish military suggests that they did have peasants serving in the army - but these were free peasants, not press-ganged serfs, and as more and more peasants fell into serfdom, the practice of employing peasants as part of the combat effectives of the army gradually ceased.

And there is also the fact that Martin's "forced peasant levy" model makes no sense within the context of the feudal society either. Military system is both the cause and the consequence of the socioeconomic conditions and the political system, and "peasant armies" and "feudal society" are fundamentally incompatible.

Modern military logistics did start with Napoleon, as did the concept of a general staff. He and his staff planned the logistics in a way not seen previously in western Europe. The Roman system relied partly on foraging and partly on their ability to build fortified points where supplies could be stored close to the areas of deployment. The main focus of Roman logistics was food and drink, since their forces were mostly infantry. Napoleon was having to manage both food and ammunition on a scale the Romans had never attempted. Bear in mind here that a Roman legion was somewhere between 5000 and 6000 men, where as Napoleons Grande Armée at its largest was over 400,000 men grouped in several corps of between 10,000 and 50,000 men. Even the divisions within the corps were bigger than a Roman legion.

"Modern military logistics", yes. "Organized military logistics", no, as you mentioned yourself with the Roman example. Hungarian armies in the 15th century were majority cavalry, and while most of it was not heavy cavalry, feeding thousands of horses in middle of winter is not exactly a simple task. Nor is it one that can be achieved solely by relying on foraging the way you stated here. Hungarian campaigns against the Ottomans usually started in the autumn, and lasted throughout the winter and until the spring. They couldn't start earlier because they had to collect the taxes and supplies before the campaign could start. And these could be major campaigns: The Long March of 1443. - 1444. saw probably as large of a field army as the kingdom could muster for an offensive war at the time - some 10 000 - 15 000 troops, with additional 5 000 provided by allies (primarily Despot Branković). Army was assembled in late August 1443., left Belgrade in mid-October 1443., and Hunyadi fought the only pitched battle of the campaign on 3 November, between Niš and Kruševac. Hungarian army reached Sofia (today's Bulgaria) by late November 1443., where it stayed until 3 December 1443. Army reached Zlatitsa Pass by 12 December, but the pass was blocked and after the assault on the Ottoman field fortifications failed, Hungarian army was forced to turn back towards Hungary. Ottomans attacked Hungarians on 24 December near Melstica, but failed to do major damage due to wagenburg. Hungarian army reached Pirot by the end of December 1443., and Kunovitsa by early January 1444., where last Ottoman attack took place. Hungarians reached Belgrade on 22 January 1444., and army disbanded there.

When you look at both when the campaign took place (autumn and winter of 1443. - 1444.), where (rather mountainous Balkans peninsula) and by what army (Hungarian and Ottoman armies were very cavalry-heavy - up to 80% cavalry in some cases), it seems unlikely that the army was able to rely solely on foraging. Partial solution was provided most likely by the extensive wagon train Hungarians had as a part of their wagenburg tactics (if memory serves me, it were the Hussites - who were the first to field wagenburgs in Europe - that were also the first medieval European army to campaign regularly during winter), but even so, logistics will not have been simple or easy.

Regarding the Roman legion, legions were rarely deployed alone. Functionally, they were in fact equivalent to Napoleon's corps or even divisions. Typical consular army during the Republic was two legions and two allied/auxilliary alae - meaning some 8 000 - 10 000 legionary troops and about the same number of auxilliaries, so some 20 000 troops in total. When Aemilius Paulus went to Macedon, his army was reinforced to some 40 000 men. And of course, when Romans faced Hannibal at Cannae, they merged two (apparently already double-strength) consular armies to form one army of 80 000 men in total. Nowhere close to size of Napoleon's Grand Army, true, but definitely far too large to be maintained by foraging for any significant period of time (or at all).

The effects that PTSD can have on people hasn't changed much and there are historical accounts of what we now recognise as PTSD dating back to Ancient Greece - the earliest account I've read is in Herodotus decription of the Battle of Marathon (490BC). I've also read Johannes Hofer's contemporary description (1688) of we would now call PTSD in Swiss soldiers.

Martin's description of the broken men in Septon Meribald's monologue is a fairly accurate description of many of those men who were in the routier bands during the Hundred Years War, both in terms of their inability to go home or fit in anywhere and in terms of their behaviour. For a more complete academic treatise and discussion I recommend you read "Routiers et mercenaires pendant la guerre de Cent ans", edited by Guilhem Pépin, Françoise Lainé and Frédéric Boutoulle.

I am aware of PTSD, but that was not what I was talking about. And while - as I have noted - my knowledge of English and French armies of the 15th century is limited, fact is that the English had a system of livery and maintenance - which, from what I have read on it, sounds rather similar to Hungarian banderial system. If that is the case, then English armies cannot have had untrained, conscripted peasants as anything other than camp followers - who might be armed in an emergency, but not used regularly as key component of combat units.

And routiers were not untrained peasants. They were, in fact, unemployed mercenaries, that is to say professional soldiers, well trained, usually well equipped, but desperate for job after being dismissed from service:

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1479&context=mcnair

If you really believe that Septon Meribald's monologue describes routiers, then it would in fact imply that a significant component of Westerosi armies are professional soldiers (or, rather, mercenaries - but distinction between the two could often get really blurry).

 

[Aldarion]

Mad Swede Now that I've paused to think about it, we might both be correct. Reason? The climate.

The societies I have studied in detail - Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, Kingdom of Hungary, Kingdom of Croatia - were all Mediterranean societies. This meant a relatively warm climate, which would allow them to have a surplus of resources necessary to maintain at least somewhat professionalized armies.

Examples you gave however seem to be primarily from the Northern Europe - England and Scandinavia. So if they could not afford to have semi-professional soldiers, "conscripted peasants" may well have been their answer.

Of course, this still does not answer all problems, such as the fact that mass conscription of peasants is in some ways fundamentally opposed to a feudal society. Generally speaking, introducing a class of people into the army leads to said class having a political voice - as happened with Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire, for example.

 

[skip.knox]

>the English had a system of livery and maintenance
Just fyi, that system (which was more of a pattern noticed by historians than an actual system) is very late medieval--15thc, 16thc.

Also, it's worth mentioning that conscription can exist without it having to be *mass* conscription. The most common practice (it varied, even within England for a particular campaign) was that each village in a particular domain owed service of N soldiers. A representative went to the village on a particular day and took down names. Those signing were "volunteers" in a sense, but if the village didn't produce the required number, there were fines to be paid, so naturally there was some pressure within the community for "volunteers" to serve. Always for just that one campaign. There was no notion of being "in the army" as a profession. I should note that specifics of all this likewise come from the late Middle Ages simply because our sources are so scanty. (which is also, btw, why general, popular notions about the Middle Ages come mainly from the LMA or even the early modern era).

As a development of the above, some communities and even minor lords, found it more expedient to pay the fines rather than try to field the troops. This was scutum--shield money. It wasn't a tax, but it was definitely a source of income. You can well imagine how hard it was for a king going to war to have even the vaguest idea of how many actual troops he would have. He had to wait to see who showed up (there would be a proclamation for all the "king's men" to be at an appointed place on an appointed day). Invariably there would be followers who arrived later and others who left early. The whole business would be comical if it weren't that killing was involved.

 

[Aldarion]

>the English had a system of livery and maintenance
Just fyi, that system (which was more of a pattern noticed by historians than an actual system) is very late medieval--15thc, 16thc.

That actually fits the part of our discussion about A Song of Ice and Fire.

Also, it's worth mentioning that conscription can exist without it having to be *mass* conscription. The most common practice (it varied, even within England for a particular campaign) was that each village in a particular domain owed service of N soldiers. A representative went to the village on a particular day and took down names. Those signing were "volunteers" in a sense, but if the village didn't produce the required number, there were fines to be paid, so naturally there was some pressure within the community for "volunteers" to serve. Always for just that one campaign. There was no notion of being "in the army" as a profession. I should note that specifics of all this likewise come from the late Middle Ages simply because our sources are so scanty. (which is also, btw, why general, popular notions about the Middle Ages come mainly from the LMA or even the early modern era).

That is actually the system I noted as Hungary having. And I am aware of the factors you are noting, but my point is that they were not being marched off to war at the spear point. And while enrollment was technically for one campaign, seeing how village was paying for equipping the troops, it is very likely that same person would be sent off for a campaign after campaign.

And that was basically the militia. Main striking power of the kingdom were in fact banners, which were semi-permanent (or sometimes even permanent) military units maintained by the nobility.

From Nicopolis to Mohacs again:

As well
as appearing in person, all landowners, barons, and nobles were required to
equip one (presumably mounted) archer from each group of 20 peasant plots.
It has long been debated in Hungarian historiography whether the soldiers
thus mustered – collectively known as the militia portalis – were peasants
or noble retainers,29 but the aim of the measure seems to be clear. Although
the decree’s statement that the new institution would exist “only as long as the
present war against the pagans would last”30 is generally taken to mean the
forthcoming Turkish attack,31 the wording was in all probability deliberately
vague. In fact, Sigismund may have hoped, through the regular mobilization
of such archers, of whatever social origins, to create a semiprofessional light
cavalry force with the ability both to stave off, and retaliate against, Turkish
raids.32 Whatever the case, an armed force recruited on the basis of a given
number of tenant plots remained part of the Hungarian military system until
1526, and more will be said about it later.

He also regularly used the contingents
maintained by the barons and prelates not only in his western wars but also
to fend off, or retaliate for, Turkish incursions; indeed, as in the time of Sigismund,
at least some of this service was financed by the barons themselves.68
Early in 1472 he declared firmly that “each subject of our realm, and especially
every prelate with his banderium, must take the field, under pain of perpetual
infidelity, alongside our majesty, against our enemies and those of our said
realm,”69 although he increasingly favoured monetary contribution in lieu of
mass military service on the Ottoman front as well.70 It was during the reign
of Matthias that the baronial banderia – and those equipped by the prelates –
started to assume the form of a third type of “standing” army, one that was not
permanent but which was relatively easy to mobilize.

And when it comes to infantry, which are often (e.g. George Martin) portrayed as conscripted peasants... majority of Hungarian infantry during the Hungarian-Ottoman wars were either heavily armored melee infantry, crossbowmen, or - especially during late 15th and early 16th century - handgunners. Considering the expense of the equipment of any of these infantrymen, them being hastily equipped and trained peasants is rather unlikely.

As a development of the above, some communities and even minor lords, found it more expedient to pay the fines rather than try to field the troops. This was scutum--shield money. It wasn't a tax, but it was definitely a source of income. You can well imagine how hard it was for a king going to war to have even the vaguest idea of how many actual troops he would have. He had to wait to see who showed up (there would be a proclamation for all the "king's men" to be at an appointed place on an appointed day). Invariably there would be followers who arrived later and others who left early. The whole business would be comical if it weren't that killing was involved.

Paying the fines rather than fielding the troops was a practice that was commonly attested in the Byzantine Empire in the 10th century and later, so it is hardly a particular characteristic of the feudal military organization. And considering sizes of many of the late medieval armies, they must have had some idea of who was going to show up, simply for reasons of logistics.

In fact, payment of fines was often preferred by the rulers themselves, because it allowed them to hire mercenaries instead. And these mercenaries - at least in the case of Hungary - just as often came from within the kingdom as they did from without.

 

[skip.knox]

>not being marched off to war at the spear point.
There's another term that can be used that might clarify the discussion here: impressment. Ordinary folk could be pressed (or impressed--the words were interchangeable in this context) into service, either naval or soldiering. That was done with violence or threat of violence.

That is different from the levy, which was the quasi-voluntary practice I was describing.

Which is different yet again from conscription. Because practice varied by time and place (and circumstance, but that's another layer of complications), it helps to specify what century and what locale is being referenced.